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THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY
The decisive American victory at the Battle of Midway in
June 1942 had profound effects on the Outcome of World
War II in its entirety, having both short- and long-term
global consequences. The well-documented short-term
consequence was that the battle ended a series of
consecutive offensive successes by Japan in the Pacific.
Much less appreciated is the long-term consequence that
the decisive victory by the United States at Midway
permitted both America and Great Britain to continue to
focus the majority of their military resources on Europe
rather than in the Pacific.
In the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941, and of Germany's and Italy's
declaration of war against the United States four days
later, the United States was faced with a dilemma in its
military response to these events. Should its main focus
of military action be in the Atlantic or the Pacific?
America was not fully prepared for war in 1941 and did
not have the capability of fighting a two-ocean war.
Efforts in one theater of operation would automatically
limit efforts in the other; attempts by the United
States to bolster its military strength in the Atlantic
would result in a diminution of its efforts in the
Pacific. Weighing the circumstances, America, along with
Great Britain committed to its "Europe First" policy on
December 22, 1941. This decision had significant
military implications regarding United States' efforts
to constrain Japanese successes in the Pacific. During
this time, America would have to forego its attempts to
take back its territories captured by Japan, namely the
Philippine Islands, Wake Island, Guam and the western
Aleutian Islands.
There were several reasons for this strategic decision
implemented jointly by the U.S. and Great Britain which
gave the conflict in Europe precedence over the war in
the Pacific. First, Great Britain was the only country
remaining in Europe that was free of German domination
and, as such, it represented the last bastion of
democracy in western Europe; second, Britain was the
only country in Europe that America could count on as a
military base; third, German submarine attacks against
U.S. Merchant Marine vessels in the Atlantic were raging
and the allies were losing these battles; and fourth,
Britain's colonies in southeast Asia, namely Hong Kong,
Singapore and Malaya had fallen to the Japanese military
by June 1942, which prevented their recapture by the
U.S. or Britain.
During the summer of 1942, the military situation in
Europe was precarious at best. Germany was winning the
Battle of the Atlantic; during June, 823,656 tons of
allied shipping were lost at sea, the worst losses of
that year so far. In addition, the military outcome in
North Africa was in doubt, as Tobruk had fallen into
German hands ten days before the Battle of Midway; the
German army was at the doorsteps of Stalingrad and the
Caucasus oil fields in southeast Russia, and most
importantly, Germany was ahead of the United States in
the development and implementation of jet and rocket
technology. Although this latter scientific achievement
was in the early stages of its development, the Germans
were rapidly closing in on realizing the full potential
of the science so as to produce a potent and superior
military weapon in its fight against the Allies. Time
was of the essence to prevent the Germans from gaining
air superiority over the skies of Europe, as well as the
capability of reaching Britain and the United States
with intercontinental ballistic missiles.
If the United States had lost all three of its carriers
at Midway, and Japan's carrier strength had remained
intact, President Roosevelt would have faced a difficult
decision because Hawaii and the entire west coast of the
United States would have been vulnerable to Japanese
attack. In addition, Australia, a significant ally in
the Pacific and a critical base for American military
operations, would have—at the very least—been
isolated by Japan's control of the sea lanes to and from
Australia. Japan would have had the ability to bomb our
oil reserves in Hawaii, which, even without an invasion,
would have successfully forced the United States Navy to
withdraw to San Diego. This in turn would have
necessitated a significant movement of naval forces from
the Atlantic to the Pacific, with no certainty of
victory assured by these deployments. This change of
tactical superiority in favor of Japan would have
seriously affected the time line of our offensive
assault on North Africa and our decision to invade
Normandy in 1944. Furthermore, these circumstances would
have provided Germany with the time needed to develop
its superior weapons in its fight against the Allies,
which could have tipped the outcome of the war in
Germany's favor or—at the very least—left the
conclusion of the war in Europe uncertain.
In addition to the events taking place in Europe, the
Soviet Union had exposed the Manchurian border to
Japanese attack by transferring many of its forces to
the west in its fight against Germany. This transition
left the border open to Japanese incursion, causing a
dilemma to the Soviet Union's military strategy at that
time: either they would have to weaken their forces in
the west or leave their left flank vulnerable to
Japanese attack. A decisive victory by Japan at Midway
would have also given Japan the option to invade the
Soviet Union on its eastern border. The Soviet Union
would then have been compelled to fight the war in
Europe on two fronts, further weakening that country's
ability to resist the German army while the Allies
invaded North Africa and later Normandy. These events
would have clearly delayed the Allies' time table in
taking the offensive in Africa and on the beaches of
Normandy.
The foregoing reveals how fragile the balance of victory
was in World War II and how events in the Pacific
clearly influenced events in the Atlantic and their
ultimate outcomes. It describes how the decisive victory
of the U.S. Navy at Midway influenced the whole of World
War II, affecting the outcomes not only in the Pacific
but in the Atlantic as well, and paved the way for the
ultimate victory by the United States and its allies
over Japan and Germany.
EWA MARINE CORPS AIRFIELD:
Ewa Marine Corps Air Field was the first U.S. military
installation to be attacked by Japanese aircraft on
December 7, 1941. An all-out effort is being pursued by
John Bond in Hawaii to designate the airfield as an
National American Battlefield under the National Park
Service (NPS). This would set the stage for the airfield
to become a National Monument under the NPS. The
designation would make Ewa Marine Corps Air Field the
first National Park and National Battlefield in West
Oahu. The IMMF fully supports this effort. To reach John
Bond you may call him at 808-685-3045.
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE
Chris and I wish all of you a very Merry Christmas and a very Happy New Year.
EDITORIAL STAFF:
JAMES M. D'ANGELO
M. CHRIS SIMS
ADDRESS:
1039 RAINBOW COURT
BRADENTON, FL 34212
TELEPHONE NUMBER:
240-460-0041
E-MAIL:
IMMF42@AOL.COM
WEB PAGE:
WWW.IMMF-MIDWAY.COM
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